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Abstract
In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric
independent private values, we scan also the right hand of each subject. We study
how the ratio of the length of the index and ring fingers (2D:4D) of the right
hand, a measure of prenatal hormone exposure, is correlated with bidding behavior
and total profits. 2D:4D has been reported to predict competitiveness in sports
competition (Manning and Taylor, 2001, and Ho¨nekopp, Manning and Mu¨ller, 2006),
risk aversion in an investment task (Dreber and Hoffman, 2007), and the average
profitability of high-frequency traders in financial markets (Coates, Gurnell and
Rustichini, 2009). We do not find any significant correlation between 2D:4D and
both bidding or profits. Yet, our study raises an issue of ethnic differences with
respect to 2D:4D.
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1 Introduction
To what extent are economic behavior and outcomes biologically determined? There is a
growing literature with empirical evidence that biological factors substantially influence
economic outcomes. Apart from the well known gender wage gap (see for instance Blau
and Kahn, 2000) and evidence that on average tall men earn more than shorter men (Case
and Paxson, 2008) and that attractive people earn on average more than less attractive
people (Kanazawa and Kovar, 2004), there is also evidence that points to more specific
biological mechanisms such as certain hormones or certain genes that determine to some
extend economic behavior. For instance, Apicella et al. (2008) find risk taking in an
investment decision is positively correlated with salivary testosterone levels in men. In
the same investment decision task, Dreber et al. (2009) associate significant more risk
taking behavior of men with the presence of the 7-repeat allele of the dopamine receptor
D4 gene. Using a lottery choice task in a design with monozygotic and dizygotic twins,
Cesarini et al. (2009) conclude that risk preferences are heritable. Finally, Kosfeld et al.
(2005), Zak et al. (2005) and Zak et al. (2007) find that exposing humans to the hormone
oxytocin increases trust, trustworthiness and generosity.
In this study we investigate to what extent competitive behavior may be influenced
by prenatal exposure to hormones such as testosterone and estrogen. That is, we are
interested in what sense competitive behavior may be influenced by biological events
before birth. We use as a proxy the “visible hand”, that is the ratio between the length
of the 2nd (index) finger and the 4th (ring) finger of the subjects’ right hand (so called
“digit ratio” or more precisely 2D:4D). (See Manning, 2002, for an introduction.) 2D:4D
is positively correlated with prenatal exposure to estrogen and negatively correlated to
prenatal exposure to testosterone (Manning et al., 1998, Ho¨nekopp et al., 2007). On
average, men have lower 2D:4D than women. 2D:4D is to a large extent genetically
determined (Paul et al., 2006), but it may also be affected by the environment in utero.
In any case, it is determined before birth and thus before common economic, social, and
cultural factors could shape competitive behavior.
There is already some indirect empirical evidence that 2D:4D may predict competitive
behavior. Manning and Taylor (2001) and Ho¨nekopp, Manning and Mu¨ller (2006) show
that lower 2D:4D predicts more competitiveness in sports. It is justified to ask whether
this result is due to a correlation with physical fitness or (mental) “competitiveness.”
Dreber and Hoffman (2007) show that risk taking in an investment task is significantly
negatively correlated with 2D:4D in white subjects but Apicella et al. (2008) show
that this is not the case in a more ethnically mixed sample. It is known that there
are differences in 2D:4D between ethnic groups (Manning, et al., 2002, Manning et al.,
2004). Both “competitiveness” and risk taking behavior are relevant for our study. We
investigate the correlation between 2D:4D and bidding behavior and profits in sealed bid
first price auctions with symmetric independent private values. It is known that higher
risk taking in those auctions amounts to relatively lower bids (see Krishna, 2002, Chapter
4.1). Thus we hypothesize that 2D:4D is positively correlated with bids and negatively
correlated with profits.
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The study most relevant to ours is Coates, Gurnell and Rustichini (2009) who find
that lower 2D:4D predicts the 20-month average profitability of 44 male high frequency
traders in London. We do not find a significant correlation of both competitive bidding
and profits with 2D:4D in repeated sealed bid first price auctions played by 192 college
students. While the study by Coates, Gurnell and Rustichini (2009) is clearly related
to ours, there are several important differences that may account for the contrasting
results. First, Coates, Gurnell and Rustichini (2009) focus on a sample of males in a
highly selected profession while we focus on a diverse sample of college students. Second,
high frequency traders compete under time pressure in a complex environment while such
pressure and complexity is absent in the sealed bid first price auction. Third, the stakes
are different. Successful traders earn more than £ 4 million a year while subjects in our
study earned on average US$ 18.81. Finally, the size of our sample is more than four
times their sample.
Ours is not the first study of 2D:4D in experimental games. Van den Bergh and
Dewitte (2006) report that in ultimatum bargaining games men with lower 2D:4D are
more likely to reject unfair offers in neutral contexts but are morel likely to accept unfair
offers in sex-related contexts. Using a public good game, Millet and Dewitte (2006) find
that men and women with lower digit ratio contribute proportionally, whereas those with
higher 2D:4D contributed either more or less.
We are also not the first to study how biological factors affect bidding in auctions.
Casari, Ham and Kagel (2007) report significantly different bidding behavior of men and
women in sealed bid first price common value auctions. Initially, women bid significantly
higher than men and hence are more prone to the winner’s curse. However, women also
learn bidding much faster than men, thus eventually their earnings may even slightly
surpass those of the men. Ham and Kagel (2006) report that females bid significantly
higher than men in two-stage first price private value auctions. Chen, Katusˇcˇa´k and
Ozdenoren (2009) study the effect of the menstrual cycle on bidding behavior of women
in sealed bid first and second price auctions with independent private values. They report
that women bid higher than men in all phases of their menstrual cycle in the first price
auction but not in the second price auction. Moreover, in the first price auction, higher
bidding in the follicular phase and lower bidding in the luteal phase is driven entirely by
oral hormonal contraceptives. No such differences appear for second price private value
auctions. These findings are contrasted in a follow-up paper by Pearson and Schipper
(2009) who report for sealed bid first price auctions that women bid significantly more
risk averse only in the menstrual and premenstrual phase but are less risk averse during
the fertile window of the cycle. They find no effect of hormonal contraceptives. They
suggest an evolutionary hypothesis according to which women are hormonally predisposed
to behave generally more riskily during their fertile phase of their menstrual cycle in
order to increase the probability of conception, quality of offspring and genetic variety.
Although these findings are different, they are provocative and warrant a further analysis
of what sense hormones may influence competitive behavior. In the current paper, we are
using the same auction environment as in Chen, Katusˇcˇa´k and Ozdenoren (2007, 2009)
and Pearson and Schipper (2009).
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The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we outline the experimental design.
The analysis of the data is presented in Section 3. A Stata dataset and do-file that
reproduces the entire analysis reported here and additional analysis is available from
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/.
2 Experimental Design
The purpose of the experiments is to correlate bidding behavior in first price auctions
with the 2D:4D. Every session of the experiment was divided into four successive phases:
instructions, bidding, questionnaire, and a scan of the right hand.
Instructions: At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to a
computer terminal. After signing a consent form, each of them received printed instructions
(see appendix). Subjects were given 5 to 7 minutes to read through the instructions,
after which instructions were read aloud by the experimenter. Then subjects were given
time to complete the review questions in private (see appendix). The experimenter went
through the questions and answers aloud, after which the experimenter discussed and
answered any additional questions from the subjects. In total, about 20 minutes of each
experimental session was spent on the instructions.
Bidding: Subjects repeatedly played a two-bidder first-price seal bid auctions with
symmetric independent private values drawn from a piecewise linear distribution function
constructed as follows: A bidder’s valuation is drawn independently with probability 0.7
from the the “low” distribution L and with probability 0.3 from the “high” distribution
H. The support of both distributions is {1, 2, ..., 100}. The respective densities, l and h,
are given by
l(x) =
{
3
200
if x ∈ {1, 2, ..., 50}
1
200
if x ∈ {51, 52, ..., 100}
h(x) =
{
1
200
if x ∈ {1, 2, ..., 50}
3
200
if x ∈ {51, 52, ..., 100}
In each round, the highest bidder wins the imaginary object and pays its bid. If both
bidder’s bid equal bids, each bidder wins with equal probability. The profit of winner
bidder is value minus bid. The loosing bidder’s payoff is zero.
Each session consisted of 8 subjects, who were randomly re-matched in each round.
Subjects played 2 practice rounds, the payoffs obtained in these rounds did not count for
the final payoff, and then 30 “real” rounds.
At the beginning of each round, bidders were privately informed on their computer
screen of their valuation. They then independently entered a bid on the computer. The
winner of each pair was determined and each subject was informed of her/his valuation,
bid, the winning bid and whether (s)he received the object and her/his total payoff
accumulated so far. (For screen shots, see Pearson and Schipper, 2009.)
4
Questionnaire: At the end of the session, subjects completed a questionnaire on
demographic information and the menstrual cycle (see Pearson and Schipper, 2009). Data
with regard to the menstrual cycle are analyzed in Pearson and Schipper (2009).
Scanning of the right hand: At the end of the experiment, we scanned each subject’s
right hand with a conventional office scanner. The length of the fingers were measured
from scanned images using Adobe Photoshop by both authors separately. The measures
used here are based on the averages of these two measurements for each finger of the
subject respectively.
The auctions were programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We used the same
software program as Chen, Katuscak and Ozdenoren (2007, 2009). We are very grateful
to Yan Chen for providing us the program. The experiment was conducted at the Social
Science and Data Service Lab at UC Davis in Fall 2007. Subjects were recruited from the
student population of UC Davis using Orsee (Greiner, 2004). Our subjects earned about
USD 18.81 with USD 5.00 as the minimum and USD 41.23 as the maximum.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of demographic variables. We got 192 subjects
in sessions to 8 subjects. Thus we have 24 independent observations. Out of the 192
subjects, 94 subjects are female. Average 2D:4D of males is significantly lower than of
females (t = −2.295, p = 0.013). This holds also for the Asian subsample (t = −3.939,
p < 0.001). But contrary to the literature, this is not the case in our white subsample
(t = 0.105, p = 0.543). The hispanic, black and other subsamples are too small to draw
meaningful conclusions.
3 Results and Discussion
For our analysis, we fix two features. First, to control for correlation across time and
subjects, we cluster standard errors at the session level. Recall that subjects play 30
rounds. Hence, their decisions in each round may be correlated across time. Moreover,
subjects are randomly rematched each round within the session of eight subjects. Hence,
their interaction may affect each other’s decisions. By clustering on the session level, we
control for such correlations (see Cameron et al., 2008).
Second, each specification of regressions on bids also includes a cubic polynomial in
the value and a set of period indicators to control for learning. Each specification on
total profits also includes the mean, the standard deviation, and the skewness of the
subject’s empirical distribution of values. We do not report these estimates here but they
are available by request.
We estimate the following parametric model for bids:
bi,t = β0 + β1vi,t + β2v
2
i,t + β3v
3
i,t + δt + ζXi + θdi + εi,t,
where bi,t is the bid of subject i at time period t = 1, ..., 30, β0 is a constant, vi,t is
the value of subject i at time period t, δt is a set of period dummies, Xi is a vector of
demographic variables including gender, age, race, number of siblings, and majors of study
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Table 1: Demographic Summary
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 192 0.49 .50 0 1
Age 192 20.52 3.00 18 36
Number of siblings 192 1.57 1.11 0 6
Math 192 0.08 0.27 0 1
All Sciences 192 0.37 0.48 0 1
Economics 192 0.41 0.49 0 1
Other Social Sciences 192 0.26 0.43 0 1
Humanities 192 0.08 0.27 0 1
Digit ratio White Male 35 0.960 0.026 0.899 1.022
Female 20 0.959 0.030 0.898 0.999
All 55 0.960 0.027 0.898 1.022
Asian Male 47 0.944 0.026 0.882 1.000
Female 65 0.963 0.026 0.912 1.033
All 112 0.955 0.028 0.882 1.033
Hispanic Male 10 0.954 0.025 0.913 1.002
Female 5 0.948 0.043 0.898 0.996
All 15 0.952 0.031 0.898 1.002
Black Male 2 0.951 0.015 0.941 0.962
Female 1 0.917 0.917 0.917
All 3 0.940 0.022 0.917 0.962
Others Male 6 0.973 0.025 0.938 0.998
Female 7 0.978 0.034 0.942 1.033
All 13 0.975 0.029 0.938 1.033
All Male 98 0.952 0.028 0.882 1.022
Female 94 0.961 0.029 0.898 1.033
All 192 0.957 0.029 0.882 1.033
depending on the specification, and di is subject i’s digit ratio. εi,t is the unobserved error
term of subject i in period t (clustered on the session level). Analogously, we estimate a
parametric model for total dollar profits (summed over all time periods) in which we drop
the time period dummies and the cubic polynomial in the value and add the mean, the
variance and the skewness of the subject’s empirical distribution of values as regressors.
Table 2 provides results for the entire sample of 192 subjects. There is a strong gender
effect for both bids and profits. On average, women bid higher than men and earn less
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Table 2: Full Sample
(bids) (bids) (profits) (profits)
Digit Ratio −1.818 5.863
(8.927) (19.030)
Female 2.223*** 2.243*** −3.336*** −3.402***
(0.629) (0.627) (1.016) (1.002)
Age −0.153 −0.152 0.340 0.338
(0.103) (0.103) (0.213) (0.216)
Num. of Siblings −0.103 −0.102 −0.177 −0.179
(0.261) (0.261) (0.331) (0.331)
Asian −0.860 −0.873 0.866 0.912
(0.724) (0.735) (1.053) (1.123)
Other −0.363 −0.372 −0.092 −0.063
(1.056) (1.060) (1.493) (1.508)
Observations 5760 5760 192 192
R2 0.84 0.84 0.27 0.27
Standard errors (Clustered at the session level) in Parentheses
Significance levels: *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%
than men. This has been reported already in Pearson and Schipper (2009), where we
trace it back to the menstrual cycle. Similar gender effects have been reported in Casari,
Ham and Kagel (2008), Ham and Kagel (2006), and Chen, Katusˇcˇa´k and Ozdenoren
(2009).
We see in Table 2 that 2D:4D does not significantly influence bidding and profits.
Moreover, in comparing the first and the second regression (and the third and the fourth
regression) we conclude that the digit ratio does not absorb any effect from the gender. In
fact, if gender is omitted (not reported in Table 2), then the 2D:4D still has no significant
effect. Moreover, including variables for choice of major does not change the results nor
does the omission of the variable for the number of siblings (not reported in Table 2). We
conclude that “the visible hand is invisible,” or more formally
Observation 1 The 2D:4D does not significantly affect bidding behavior or profits in the
full sample.
Since 2D:4D is dimorphic with respect to gender, we may obtain significant effects
when separating our sample by gender. In fact, some prior studies of the digit ratio in
psychology have found significant effects of 2D:4D for men but not for women. (E.g., see
Sanders et al., 2005, for a mental rotation task.)
Table 3 presents results separated by gender. Again, there are no significant effects of
2D:4D on bidding behavior and profits. This holds also when controlling for majors or
dropping the variables for the number siblings (not reported in Table 3). We conclude
Observation 2 The 2D:4D does not significantly affect bidding behavior or profits in
both male or female subsamples.
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Table 3: Sample Separated by Gender
(bids-female) (profits-female) (bids-male) (profits-male)
Digit Ratio −9.697 31.794 8.731 −12.229
(11.371) (19.051) (14.952) (31.221)
Age −0.032 0.105 −0.265* 0.546**
(0.170) (0.262) (0.140) (0.260)
Num. of Siblings −0.512 0.334 0.241 −0.546
(0.431) (0.537) (0.443) (0.497)
Asian −1.315 0.275 −0.243 1.122
(1.059) (1.389) (1.193) (1.965)
Other −1.407 1.557 0.075 −0.729
(1.627) (2.221) (1.673) (1.975)
Observations 2820 94 2940 98
R2 0.85 0.14 0.84 0.33
Standard errors (Clustered at the session level) in Parentheses
Significance levels: *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%
It is known from prior studies of the correlation between the digit ratio and risk taking
that effects of 2D:4D may depend on ethnic groups (Apicella et al., 2008, Dreber and
Hoffman, 2007). Therefore we studied the two major ethnic groups in our sample, Whites
and Asians, in isolation. The results are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: White and Asian Subsamples
(bids-white) (profits-white) (bids-asian) (profits-asian)
Digit Ratio −24.346 60.363** 13.458 −10.014
(20.461) (28.801) (13.802) (30.573)
Female 3.789*** −4.422** 2.046** −4.083***
(1.060) (1.754) (0.826) (1.372)
Age −0.249** 0.394 −0.168 0.373
(0.105) (0.264) (0.263) (0.461)
Num. of Siblings 0.172 0.013 −0.703* 0.115
(0.360) (0.629) (0.365) (0.491)
Observations 1650 55 3360 112
R2 0.86 0.41 0.84 0.25
Standard errors (Clustered at the session level) in Parentheses
Significance levels: *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%
There is a significant effect of the digit ratio on profits for the white subsample, but no
such an effect for bids or the Asian subsample. Moreover, the effect is positive, which is
contrary to what one would expect given that lower digit ratios are correlated with lower
testosterone levels. That is, the higher the digit ratio the higher the profit. Moreover,
given that the differences of 2D:4D between white males and females are the opposite of
what is reported in the literature - although this difference is not significant in our sample
- we are not confident in the result. This led us to study the subsamples further.
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In Table 5 we separated the white subsample further into the male white subsample
and the female white subsample. We observe that the significant effect of the digit ratio
on profits persists for males but not for females. Again, the effect is contrary to what one
might expect.
Table 5: White Subsamples
(bids-male) (profits-male) (bids-female) (profits-female)
Digit Ratio −42.078 99.760* −3.375 29.449
(32.648) (50.801) (18.664) (32.019)
Age −0.216 0.327 −0.252** 0.241
(0.201) (0.444) (0.098) (0.189)
Num. of Siblings 0.012 0.107 0.402 −0.495
(0.541) (0.960) (0.371) (0.678)
Observations 1050 35 600 20
R2 0.86 0.41 0.89 0.41
Standard errors (Clustered at the session level) in Parentheses
Significance levels: *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%
Interestingly, we see in Table 4 that age is statistically significant for the bids of the
white subsample. It appears that the older the student, the lower are his or her bids on
average. Table 5 suggests that this is due to white female students in our sample. Yet,
the number of observations is rather low since we just have 20 white female students
among our subjects. We are not confident to claim any significant effect.
Table 6 shows the results for our subsample of Asian students. Close inspection reveals
that the digit ratio is marginally significant for bids of Asian males (p = 0.106) but not
for their profits or for the bids or profits of Asian females. This finding is also in the
expected direction, that is, the lower the digit ratio the lower the bids. Again, age of
Asian males seems to influence their profits positively and their bids negatively.
Table 6: Asian Subsamples
(bids-male) (profits-male) (bids-female) (profits-female)
Digit Ratio 34.914 −57.658 −2.851 27.333
(20.678) (45.814) (17.650) (32.181)
Age −0.445* 0.911* 0.115 −0.017
(0.245) (0.469) (0.291) (0.512)
Num. of Siblings −0.532 −0.123 −0.931 0.393
(0.769) (0.960) (0.590) (0.631)
Observations 1410 47 1950 65
R2 0.84 0.33 0.85 0.11
Standard errors (Clustered at the session level) in Parentheses
Significance levels: *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%
The digit ratio may interact with ethnicity. It is known that there are differences in
2D:4D between ethnic groups (Manning, et al., 2002, Manning et al., 2004). Moreover,
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recall that Dreber and Hoffman (2007) report significantly more risk taking in an invest-
ment task for lower 2D:4D in White subjects but Apicella et al. (2008) show that this
is not the case in a more ethnically mixed sample. Additional observations may yield
sharper results.
Observation 3 The evidence on the effect of 2D:4D on bidding behavior and profits with
regard to White and Asian subsamples is inconclusive.
We note that the digit ratio is a noisy measure of prenatal hormone levels. Moreover,
our measure of the digit ratio adds additional noise. For instance, if we use the measure-
ments of the digits by the first coauthor, the effects on bids by Asian males are significant
while they are not with the average of authors measures. So perhaps it is not surprising
that we don’t find a strong correlation.
A Instructions
Introduction
You are about to participate in a decision process in which an imaginary object will be auctioned off for
each group of participants in each of 30 rounds. This is part of a study intended to provide insight into
certain features of decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions
you may earn a bit of money. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment, we ask that you please do not talk to each other. If you have a question,
please raise your hand and an experimenter will assist you.
You may refuse to participate in this study. You may change your mind about being in the study
and quit after the study has started.
Procedure
In each of 30 rounds, you will be randomly matched with one other participant into a group. Each group
has two bidders. You will not know the identity of the other participant in your group. Your payoff each
round depends ONLY on the decisions made by you and the other participant in your group.
In each of 30 rounds, each bidder’s value for the object will be randomly drawn from 1 of 2
distributions:
High value distribution: If a bidder’s value is drawn from the high value distribution, then
– with 25% chance it is randomly drawn from the set of integers between 1 and 50, where each
integer is equally likely to be drawn.
– with 75% chance it is randomly drawn from the set of integers between 51 and 100, where
each integer is equally likely to be drawn.
For example, if you throw a four-sided die, and it shows up 1, your value will be equally likely to
take on an integer value between 1 and 50. If it shows up 2, 3 or 4, your value will be equally
likely to take on an integer value between 51 and 100.
Low value distribution: If a bidder’s value is drawn from the low value distribution, then
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– with 75% chance it is randomly drawn from the set of integers between 1 and 50, where each
integer is equally likely to be drawn.
– with 25% chance it is randomly drawn from the set of integers between 51 and 100, where
each integer is equally likely to be drawn.
For example, if you throw a four-sided die, and if it shows up 1, 2 or 3, your value will be equally
likely to take on an integer value between 1 and 50. If it shows up 4, your value will be equally
likely to take on an integer value between 51 and 100.
Therefore, if your value is drawn from the high value distribution, it can take on any integer value
between 1 and 100, but it is three times more likely to take on a higher value, i.e., a value between 51
and 100.
Similarly, if your value is drawn from the low value distribution, it can take on any integer value
between 1 and 100, but it is 3 times more likely to take on a lower value, i.e., a value between 1 and 50.
In each of 30 rounds, each bidder’s value will be randomly and independently drawn from the high
value distribution with 30% chance, and from the low value distribution with 70% chance. You will not
be told which distribution your value is drawn from. The other bidders’ values might be drawn from
a distribution different from your own. In any given round, the chance that your value is drawn from
either distribution does not affect how other bidders’ values are drawn.
Each round consists of the following stages:
Bidders are informed of their private value, and then each bidder will simultaneously and independently
submit a bid, which can be any integer between 1 and 100, inclusive.
The bids are collected in each group and the object is allocated according to the rules of the auction
explained in the next section.
Bidders will get the following feedback on their screen: your value, your bid, the winning bid, whether
you got the object, and your payoff.
The process continues.
Rules of the Auction and Payoffs
In each round,
• if your bid is greater than the other bid, you get the object and pay your bid:
Your Payoff = Your Value - Your Bid;
• if your bid is less than the other bid, you don’t get the object:
Your Payoff = 0.
• if your bid is equal to the other bid, the computer will break the tie by flipping a fair coin. Such
that:
with 50% chance you get the object and pay your bid:
Your Payoff = Your Value - Your Bid;
with 50% chance you don’t get the object:
Your Payoff = 0.
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There will be 30 rounds. There will be 2 practice rounds. From the first round, you will be paid for
each decision you make.
Your total payoff is the sum of your payoffs in the 30 “real” rounds.
The exchange rate is $1 for 13 points.
We encourage you to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions?
Review Questions: Please raise your hand if you have any questions. After 5 minutes we will go
through the answers together.
1. Suppose your value is 60 and you bid 62.
If you get the object, your payoff =.
If you don’t get the object, your payoff =.
2. Suppose your value is 60 and you bid 60.
If you get the object, your payoff =.
If you don’t get the object, your payoff =.
3. Suppose your value is 60 and you bid 58.
If you get the object, your payoff =.
If you don’t get the object, your payoff =.
4. In each of 30 rounds, each bidder’s value will be randomly and independently drawn from the
high value distribution with % chance.
5. Suppose your value is drawn from the low value distribution. With what % chance is the other
bidder’s valuation also drawn from the low distribution?
6. True or False:
If a bidder’s value is 25, it must have been drawn from the low distribution.
If a bidder’s value is 60, it must have been drawn from the high distribution.
You will be playing with the same two participants for the entire experiment.
A bidder’s payoff depends only on his/her own bid.
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